Statically Analyzing Information Flows - An Abstract Interpretation-based Hyperanalysis for Non-Interference. by Mastroeni, Isabella & Pasqua, Michele
Statically Analyzing Information Flows
An Abstract Interpretation-based Hyperanalysis for Non-Interference
Isabella Mastroeni
University of Verona - Dept. of Computer Science
Verona, Italy
isabella.mastroeni@univr.it
Michele Pasqua∗
University of Verona - Dept. of Computer Science
Verona, Italy
michele.pasqua@univr.it
ABSTRACT
In the context of systems security, information flows play a central
role. Unhandled information flows potentially leave the door open
to very dangerous types of attacks, such as code injection or sen-
sitive information leakage. Information flows verification is based
on the definition of Non-Interference [8], which is known to be an
hyperproperty [7], i.e., a property of sets of executions. The sound
verification of hyperproperties is not trivial [3, 16]: It is not easy
to adapt classic verification methods, used for trace properties, in
order to deal with hyperproperties. In the present work, we design
an abstract interpretation-based static analyzer soundly checking
Non-Interference. In particular, we define an hyper abstract do-
main, able to approximate the information flows occurring in the
analyzed programs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Programs security often relies on how information is propagated
during programs executions. Historically, in the context of con-
fidentiality, access control has been the main means of prevent-
ing information from being disseminated. As the name indicates,
access control verifies the program rights at entry-point. How-
ever, it is inadequate in many situations, in fact the program may
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leak/compromise information after the access check. Instead in-
formation flow control tracks how information propagates through
the program during execution to make sure that it handles the
information safely. A security mechanism, given a program and a
specification stating which flows of information are allowed and
which are not, checks whether the program is secure w.r.t. the given
specification. In general, unhandled information flows potentially
leave the door open to very dangerous types of attacks, such as
code injection or sensitive information leakage.
Information flow control is based on the definition of Non-
Interference [8], where variables are marked as public or private,
and flows from the public ones to the private ones are forbidden.
Indeed, a program is said to be non-interferent if the values of the
public outputs (i.e., at the end of the execution) do not depend on
the values of the private inputs (i.e., at the beginning of the execu-
tion), in other words if whenever we start from states agreeing on
the public inputs, the public observable outputs are the same.
The problem of Non-Interference verification is far from solved.
Indeed, Non-Interference is a hard problem to solve due to two
main reasons: it is undecidable and it is not even a trace property,
in the sense that it cannot be verified on single executions, since it
requires the comparison of multiple computations. In other words
it is an undecidable hyperproperty [7].
Both these problems are tackled by approximation, in particular
by designing trace properties stronger than Non-Interference, but
which can be verified by means of standard techniques, inherited
from classic programs verification for trace properties. Unfortu-
nately, this means that we introduce two degrees of approximation,
one for approximating Non-Interference as a trace property and
one for making it decidable.
Whilst for trace properties standard analysis techniques can be
used with an acceptable degree of approximation, the verification,
and hence the approximation, of hyperproperties is a hard problem
to solve in a sufficiently precise way. Being a hyperproperty means
to be modeled as a set of sets, and the extra level of sets introduces
a lot of technical problems for approximation-based verification
methods. Hence, in order to obtain significant results w.r.t. analysis
precision, we need new verification methods which approximate
sets of sets (instead of just sets) of executions [16].
In [17], the authors propose a general framework for design-
ing abstract interpretations for hyperproperties verification. In the
present work, our aim is to instantiate this framework to the verifica-
tion of Non-Interference, allowing us to design a prototype analyzer
of Non-Interference for a toy programming language. In particular,
we first design the abstract domain denoting the hyperproperty that
has to be satisfied by the semantics of non-interfering programs,
i.e., the values of public variables must be always the same single
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value. Unfortunately, this ideal domain (observing the precise single
public values of all the computations starting from the same public
input) is infinite and does not guarantee decidability of the analysis,
hence we need to introduce further abstractions. Once we fix the
domain of the abstract observable hyperproperty we define the
abstract hypersemantics computing a program’s executions on the
abstract domain, exactly as it happens in classic static analysis, but
with the only difference that we are abstracting a hypersemantics
into a hyperdomain. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
attempt to provide a sound analyzer of Non-Interference exploiting
the expressiveness of hyperproperties.
Finally, in order to test the feasibility of the proposed approach
we have implemented a prototype (called nonInterfer) of the de-
signed analyzer. This prototype exhibits a good trade-off between
verification speed and precision. It can be tested at the link http:
//bit.do/noninterfer, via a web interface.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we set the background concepts needed to intro-
duce our prototype analyzer. First, we define a toy programming
language for which we design the analyzer. Then we make a brief
introduction to hyperproperties and, finally, we have two little para-
graphs, one for abstract interpretation and one for Non-Interference.
2.1 Programs
Programs are written in a simple deterministic imperative language
Imp, whose grammar is the following:
Aexp ∋ a F x | n | a ⊕ a | (a)
Bexp ∋ b F tt | ff | b ∧ b | b ∨ b | ¬b | a Z a | (b)
Imp ∋ P F skip | x B a | P ; P | if b {P} else {P} | while b {P}
with ⊕ ∈ {+,−, ∗} and Z∈ {=,,, <, ≤}
Variables x ∈ Var range over integer values, hence arithmetic ex-
pressions evaluate to values in Z. Boolean expressions evaluate
to boolean values in B ≜ {tt,ff}. The semantics of the language
is given on top of memories, namely maps from variables to val-
ues. Let Mem ≜ Var −→ Z be the set of programs memories. We
define the semantics of a program inductively from its syntax. In
particular, it is built on top of the small-step operational semantics
(SOS) of Imp. This latter models the execution of programs step
by step and it is specified by a set of inference rules modifying
configurations. A configuration ⟨m, P⟩ ∈ Mem× Imp represents the
current memorym in which the program P has to be executed. The
SOS inference rules in Fig. 1 describe how configurations evolve
during time, until a final configuration of the form ⟨m, skip⟩ is
reached (if ever). The SOS rules rely on the semantics for arith-
metic expressions LaM ∈ Mem −→ Z and for boolean expressionsLbM ∈ Mem −→ B. These latter are big-step semantics, since we are
not interested in the intermediate steps of computation for expres-
sions. In Fig. 2 we have the definition of the (big-step) semantics for
expressions. We denote with_k the application of_ a number
k > 1 of times, hence ⟨m, P⟩ _k ⟨m′, P′⟩ if there exists a sequence
σ of k configurations such that: σ0 = ⟨m,P⟩, σk−1 = ⟨m′,P′⟩ and
∀i ∈ [0,k − 1) . σi _ σi+1. We denote with ⟨m,P⟩ _∗ ⟨m′,P′⟩
the fact that there exists a k > 1 such that ⟨m,P⟩ _k ⟨m′,P′⟩.
A program P, starting in the memory m, terminates, yielding the
memory m′, iff ⟨m,P⟩ _∗ ⟨m′, skip⟩. Conversely, P diverges (on
m) iff it is possible to apply_ to ⟨m,P⟩ infinitely many times.
2.2 Hyperproperties
In the field of information security, verification is the general pro-
cess of checking if a system complies with a specification, i.e., a
formal description of what systems are allowed and/or are not al-
lowed to do. The majority of works about verification deal with
particular specifications, those expressible with the so called trace
properties, often simply called “properties”. They are defined in
terms of single executions and hence cannot express specifications
which need to take into account relations between executions. In
[7], hyperproperties were introduced in order to formalize those
specifications which are not trace properties. When systems are
programs in Imp then program executions can be modeled as traces
of state denotations. Examples of traces could be the set of all pos-
sible sequences of memories generated by the SOS of programs or
the set of reachable memories, etc. The behavior (semantics) SP
of a system (program) P is modeled as a set of traces, one for each
possible input. In this setting, trace properties are sets of traces and
hyperproperties are sets of sets of traces. The satisfiability relation
is the set inclusion for trace property and the set membership for
hyperproperties. Namely, P satisfies the trace property P, written
P |= P, iff SP ⊆ P and it satisfies the hyperproperty Hp, written
P |= Hp, iff SP ∈ Hp. The satisfiability for hyperproperties can
be restated using set inclusion, in fact SP ∈ Hp iff {SP} ⊆ Hp.
The strongest program trace property of P is precisely SP and its
strongest hyperproperty is {SP} [10, 16]. Strongest here means
that every property[hyperproperty] satisfied by P is implied by (i.e.,
contains) SP[{SP}]. In order to prove that a program P satisfies
⟨m, P1 ⟩_ ⟨m′, P3 ⟩
⟨m, P1 ; P2 ⟩_ ⟨m′, P3 ; P2 ⟩
−
⟨m, skip ; P⟩_ ⟨m, P⟩
Lb Mm = tt
⟨m, if b {P1 } else {P2 }⟩_ ⟨m, P1 ⟩
Lb Mm = ff
⟨m, if b {P1 } else {P2 }⟩_ ⟨m, P2 ⟩
Lb Mm = tt
⟨m, while b {P}⟩_ ⟨m, P ; while b {P}⟩ Lb Mm = ff⟨m, while b {P}⟩_ ⟨m, skip⟩
La Mm = n
⟨m, x B a⟩_ ⟨m[x ←[ n], skip⟩
Figure 1: Small-step operational semantics of Imp.
Arithmetic expressions: La M ∈ Mem −→ ZLn Mm = n Lx Mm = m(x) L (a) Mm = La MmLa1 ⊕ a2 Mm = La1 Mm ⊕ La2 Mm where ⊕ ∈ {+, −, ∗}
Boolean expressions: Lb M ∈ Mem −→ BLtt Mm = tt Lff Mm = ff L (b) Mm = Lb Mm L¬b Mm = ¬Lb MmLb1 ∧ b2 Mm = Lb1 Mm ∧ Lb2 Mm Lb1 ∨ b2 Mm = Lb1 Mm ∨ Lb2 MmLa1 Z a2 Mm = La1 Mm Z La2 Mm where Z∈ {=, ,, <, ≤}
Figure 2: Big-step semantics for expressions.
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a property[hyperproperty] we use an over-approximation of the
strongest P property[hyperproperty].
Some specifications can be expressed as trace properties, like
Access Control, and others cannot, like Non-Interference. Among all
hyperproperties there are some easier to verify. In [17], the authors
define k-bounded subset-closed hyperproprties: these specifications
can be refuted just exhibiting a counterexample set consisting in at
most k traces. It turns out that several interesting hyperproperties
are k-bounded (like Non-Interference). In Sec. 4 we will see how
we can exploit this fact in order to verify Non-Interference.
2.3 Abstract Interpretation
The (concrete) semantic of a program, namely its behavior, is a
representation of all its possible executions by means of a set of
mathematical objects. This set is, in general, not computable: It is
not possible for a program to represent and to compute all possi-
ble executions of any program starting from all its possible inputs.
Clearly all non trivial properties of the concrete semantics of a
program are undecidable: It is not possible for a program to an-
swer any question about the executions of any program. Abstract
interpretation is born, as a theory for soundly approximating the
semantics of discrete dynamic systems. The approximation consists
in the observation of the semantics at a specified level of abstraction,
focusing only on some important aspects of computations. In this
setting, abstract interpretation allows us to compute an abstract
semantics of the program, depending on the properties of interest.
The approximation is sound by design, in the sense that what holds
in the abstract holds also in the concrete (no false negative).
One of the fundamental aspects of abstract interpretation is
that the majority of the features of the approximation process are
specified only by the (abstract) domain of mathematical objects
chosen for representing the properties of interest. A theory of
domains for abstract interpretation was defined in [9], based on the
notion of Galois insertion. A Galois insertion (C,α ,γ ,A) consists
of two partially ordered sets ⟨C, ≤C ⟩, ⟨A, ≤A⟩ and two monotone
functions α ∈ C −→ A, γ ∈ A −→ C such that for all c in C and a in
A it holds: α(c) ≤A a ⇔ c ≤C γ (a) and α ◦ γ = id (the identity
function λx . x ). C is the concrete domain, A is the abstract domain,
α is the abstraction function and γ is the concretization function.
Sometimes, abstract interpretations are given by means of Galois
connections (instead of Galois insertions), relaxing the constraints
α ◦γ = id. This do not restrict the generality of the framework, since
every connection can be transformed in an insertion, eliminating
the redundant elements in the abstract domain.
Let f ∈ C −→ C be a function on the concrete domain and
f ♮ ∈ A −→ A be a function on the abstract domain. f ♮ is a sound
(or correct) approximation of f if f ◦ γ = γ ◦ f ♮ or, equivalently, if
α ◦ f = f ♮ ◦α [9]. The best correct approximation of f inA, defined
as f bca ≜ α ◦ f ◦ γ , is sound by construction [9]. Hence, in order
to prove that a given abstract function f ♮ is sound, it is sufficient
to prove that it approximates f bca, i.e., if ∀a ∈ A . f bca(a) ≤A f ♮(a).
2.4 Non-Interference
Computing system security relies on how information is propa-
gated during system execution. Information flow control tracks
how information propagates through the system during execution
to make sure that the system handles the information securely.
In the last forty years, a lot of specifications for information flow
control have been proposed (see [14] for a survey). They differ
on the formal definitions but share the following common infor-
mal understanding of confidentiality: the lack of dependencies on
confidential information. This is precisely the absence of strong
dependency of [8] and it is the base of confidentiality information
flow specifications. The idea of [8] is that there exists an informa-
tion flow from variable x to variable y in a program P whenever
variety in x is conveyed to y by the execution of P. The original
formulation of Non-Interference [8] takes in consideration only
two security levels: private (H), i.e., information that has to be kept
secret, and public (L), i.e., information that could be freely released.
A program is said non-interferent if there are no information flows
from private to public variables, and interferent otherwise.
3 SIMPLIFYING NON-INTERFERENCE
VERIFICATION
In the following, we define Non-Interference for programs in Imp
and we show how to derive a verification mechanism for it. The clas-
sic notion of Non-Interference [8] checks the input/output relation
between executions, so we represent programs computations with
just the initial and the final memories. Furthermore, it is not ter-
mination sensitive, hence we ignore divergent computations. With
these premises, the set of executions denotations isMem ×Mem.
It is well known that information flows are hyperproperties [7],
indeed Non-Interference NI ∈ ℘(℘(Mem ×Mem)) is defined as:
NI ≜
{
X ⊆ Mem ×Mem
 ∀⟨m1,m′1⟩, ⟨m2,m′2⟩ ∈ X .m1 =L m2 ⇒ m′1 =L m′2
}
The relation =L says that memories agree on public variables, i.e.,
m =L m′ iff ∀x . Γ(x) = L ⇒ m(x) = m′(x). Here Γ ∈ Var −→ {L,H}
is the typing environment, assigning variables to security levels.
Given a program P ∈ Imp, its semantics (i.e., its strongest prop-
erty) on Mem × Mem is ×SP ∈ ℘(MemP × MemP), defined as
×SP ≜ {⟨m,m′⟩ | ⟨m,P⟩ _∗ ⟨m′, skip⟩}. Its hypersemantics (i.e.,
its strongest hyperproperty) is ×HSP ≜ {×SP}. Hence we have that
P |= NI iff ×SP ∈ NI or, equivalently, iff ×HSP ⊆ NI.
Nowwewill see how the verification process for Non-Interference
can be made simpler. Since NI is a 2-bounded subset-closed hyper-
property [17], we have that P |= NI iff ×HSP#2 ≜ {X ⊆ ×SP | |X | =
2} ⊆ NI. We can note that ×HSP#2 can be partitioned in
×HSP#2, ≜
{{⟨m1,m′1⟩, ⟨m2,m′2⟩}  m1 ,L m2} and
×HSP#2= ≜
{{⟨m1,m′1⟩, ⟨m2,m′2⟩}  m1 =L m2}
namely, ×HSP#2, ∪ ×HSP#2= = ×HSP#2 and ×HSP#2, ∩ ×HSP#2= = ∅. At
this point, as far as NI is concerned, we can observe that ×HSP#2, ⊆
NI always holds, hence we have the following result.
Proposition 3.1. P |= NI iff ×HSP#2= ⊆ NI.
Example 3.2. Consider P = x B y ; y B 1, with Γ(x) = L and
Γ(y) = H. Suppose that variables can only take values 0 and 1. In
order to simplify, consider the following encoding of memories:
a ≜ [x 7→0 y 7→0], b ≜ [x 7→0 y 7→1], c ≜ [x 7→1 y 7→0], d ≜ [x 7→
1 y 7→1]. The semantics of P is ×SP = {⟨a, b⟩, ⟨b, d⟩, ⟨c, b⟩, ⟨d, d⟩}.
Then ×HSP#2= = {{⟨a, b⟩, ⟨b, d⟩}, {⟨c, b⟩, ⟨d, d⟩}} and ×HSP#2, =
{{⟨a, b⟩, ⟨c, b⟩}, {⟨a, b⟩, ⟨d, d⟩}, {⟨b, d⟩, ⟨c, b⟩}, {⟨b, d⟩, ⟨d, d⟩}}.
SAC ’19, April 8–12, 2019, Limassol, Cyprus I. Mastroeni and M. Pasqua
The verification process for Non-Interference can be simplified
even further. Take in consideration the following approximation
αr ∈ ℘(℘(Mem ×Mem)) −→ ℘(℘(Mem) × ℘(Mem)):
αr ≜ λX .
{⟨{a | ⟨a,b⟩ ∈ X }, {b | ⟨a,b⟩ ∈ X }⟩  X ∈ X}
which abstracts the relation between the input and the output mem-
ories of traces (i.e., we only keep the relation between the whole
set of input memories and the whole set of output memories). Then
consider a further approximation αn ∈ ℘(℘(Mem) × ℘(Mem)) −→
℘(℘(Mem)) × ℘(℘(Mem)):
αn ≜ λX . ⟨{A | ⟨A,B⟩ ∈ X }, {B | ⟨A,B⟩ ∈ X }⟩
which abstracts the relation between sets of traces (i.e., we only
keep the relation between the set of all the possible input sets of
memories and the set of all the output sets of memories). Finally,
setting αnr ≜ αn ◦ αr we have that αnr and its left adjoint α−nr
form the Galois connection1:
⟨℘(℘(Mem ×Mem)), ⊆⟩ −−−−−→←−−−−−αnr
α−nr ⟨℘(℘(Mem)) × ℘(℘(Mem)), ⊆⟩
Now we are able to state a simplified form of verification check for
Non-Interference:
P |= NI ⇔ αnr (×HSP#2= ) ⊆ αnr (NI)
We can note that αnr (×HSP#2= ) ⊆ αnr (NI) iff the set αnr (×HSP#2= )⊣
contains only sets of memories {m,m′} agreeing on the L variables,
i.e., such that m =L m′. Here, given a pair ⟨x ,y⟩, we denote with
⟨x ,y⟩⊣ ≜ y its projection on the second element (analogously, we
denote with ⟨x ,y⟩⊢ ≜ x its projection on the first element).
Example 3.3. Continuing Ex. 3.2, we have that αnr (×HSP#2= ) is
equal to αn ({⟨{a, b}, {b, d}⟩, ⟨{c, d}, {b, d}⟩}), which is the pair
⟨{{a, b}, {c, d}}, {{b, d}}⟩. In this case, program P does not satisfy
Non-Interference since αnr (×HSP#2= )⊣ = {{b, d}} and b ,L d.
Basically, we can verify Non-Interference just checking whether
αnr (×HSP#2= )⊣ satisfies a hyperproperty on the set of execution
denotationsMem, as state by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4. P |= NI iff αnr (×HSP#2= )⊣ ⊆ equivL, where
equivL ≜
{
X ⊆ Mem  ∀m,m′ ∈ X .m =L m′}.
This simplifies a lot the verification process for Non-Interference:
We can build a hypersemantics computing on ℘(℘(Mem)) instead
of ℘(℘(Mem ×Mem)).
4 ABSTRACT HYPERSEMANTICS
Classic methods for the verification of trace properties rely on the so
called collecting semantics, namely a representation of a program’s
behaviors starting from every possible input. This semantics essen-
tially computes the strongest program property. With a computable
approximation of this latter the verification process is made feasible.
Unfortunately, for hyperproperties this is not sufficient anymore: a
collecting hypersemantics, computing the strongest program hy-
perproperty, is needed [3, 16]. Then the verification is performed
with an approximation of this latter. In this section we give a col-
lecting hypersemantics and its abstract version for the verification
1We abuse notation denoting with ⊆ both set-inclusion and its component-wise
extension to pairs, i.e., ⟨X, Y⟩ ⊆ ⟨T, Z⟩ ≜ (X ⊆ T ∧ Y ⊆ X).
of Non-Interference. In particular, we follow the construction intro-
duced in [17] for k-bounded subset-closed hyperproperties (indeed
Non-Interference is 2-bounded). First, we give the definition of
the collecting hypersemantics, computing at the level of sets of
sets. Then we instantiate the hyperlevel constants domain of [17]
to Non-Interference. This latter, in its original formulation, is not
machine-representable [11], namely it has an uncountable set of
elements. Moreover, it contains infinite ascending chains (i.e., it is
not ACC), inducing potential computation divergence. Hence, we
approximate it in order to make its implementation feasible. Finally,
we give the definition of the abstract semantics.
4.1 Collecting Hypersemantics
As we have seen in Sec. 3 (Prop. 3.4), we can verify Non-Interference
in a simpler domain, namely we can collect memories instead of
input/output traces of memories. We move from ℘(Mem ×Mem)
to ℘(Mem), with the abstraction αR ≜ λX . {m′ | ⟨m,m′⟩ ∈ X }
collecting all final memories of input/output traces. Hence, we have
that the strongest trace property of P induced by its semantics
on the domain Mem is RSP ≜ αR (×SP) = {m′ | ∃m . ⟨m,P⟩ _∗
⟨m′, skip⟩}. Analogously, the strongest hyperproperty of P onMem
is RHSP ≜ {αR (×SP)} = {RSP}.
In order to compute this semantics, we follow the construction
given in [17] (Sect. 3.1). We start with a classic collecting seman-
tics JPK ∈ ℘(Mem) −→ ℘(Mem), defined inductively on programs
statements, computing post-conditions:JPK∅ ≜ ∅ JP1 ; P2KX ≜ JP2KJP1KX JskipKX ≜ XJx B aKX ≜ {m[x ←[ LaMm] | m ∈ X }Jif b {P1} else {P2}KX ≜ JP1KJbKX ∪ JP2KJ¬bKXJwhile b {P}KX ≜ J¬bK(lfp⊆∅ λT .X ∪ JPKJbKT )
Here JbK ∈ ℘(Mem) −→ ℘(Mem) is the classic filtering function
which selects the memories making b true, namely JbKX ≜ {m ∈
X | LbMm = tt}. Note that JPK computes exactly the strongest trace
property of P, namely JPKMem = RSP. Then we have to lift this
semantics on sets of sets, obtaining a collecting hypersemanticsJPKh ∈ ℘(℘(Mem)) −→ ℘(℘(Mem)):JPKh∅ ≜ ∅ JP1 ; P2KhX ≜ JP2KhJP1KhX JskipKhX ≜ XJx B aKhX ≜ {Jx B aKX  X ∈ X}Jif b {P1} else {P2}KhX ≜ {JP1KJbKX ∪ JP2KJ¬bKX  X ∈ X}Jwhile b {P}KhX ≜ J¬bKh (lfp⊆∅ F) where
F ≜ λT .X ∪ {JPKJbKT ∪ J¬bKT  T ∈ T }
This latter semantics is very similar to the hypercollecting semantics
of [3], instantiated on sets of sets of memories instead of sets of sets
of input/output traces. Again, JbKh ∈ ℘(℘(Mem)) −→ ℘(℘(Mem)) is
a filtering function, namely JbKhX ≜ {{m ∈ X | LbMm = tt} | X ∈
X} \ {∅}. In this case JPKh is not exactly the strongest hyperprop-
erty of P, but it is a correct approximation, i.e., RHSP ⊆ JPKh {Mem}
[17]. Luckily, for subset-closed hyperproperties, as equivL, this is
not a problem because JPKh is complete for such hyperproperties,
namely P |= equivL iff JPKh {Mem} ⊆ equivL [17]. Nevertheless,
we are not interested in the strongest hyperproperty of P, since
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it is not necessary for proving Non-Interference. Instead, due to
Prop. 3.4, it is sufficient to compute αnr (×HSP#2= )⊣ and this boils
down to computing JPKh starting fromI2,L ≜ {{m,m′} | m =L m′}.
In fact, it is easy to see that αnr (×HSP#2= )⊣ and JPKhI2,L coincide
with the set:{m′1,m′2} ⊆ Mem
 ∃m1,m2 . ⟨m1,P⟩ _
∗ ⟨m′1, skip⟩ ∧⟨m2,P⟩ _∗ ⟨m′2, skip⟩ ∧
m1 =L m2

This observation induces the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. P |= NI iff JPKhI2,L ⊆ equivL.
4.2 Towards Abstraction
Unfortunately, JPKhI2,L and equivL are not computable in general,
hence we need approximations. In order to compute a sound approx-
imation of JPKhI2,L, we rely on abstract interpretation. The first step
is to define the abstract domain used to verify Non-Interference.
4.2.1 The Abstract Domain for Non-Interference. The domain is
an instance of the hyperlevel (abstract) constants of [17], and it
checks whether a set of sets of values contains constant sets. In
the following, all abstraction functions α are additive (i.e., they
preserve the least upper bound of chains), hence their left adjoint
α− always exists2. From now on, we will often use the operator
( cond ? doTrue : doFalse ) in order to denote in-line conditional
definitions, namely its semantics is: if the condition cond is true
then substitute the operator with doTrue otherwise substitute it
with doFalse. Mathematically:
( cond ? doTrue : doFalse ) =
{
doTrue if cond is true
doFalse otherwise
Furthermore, we will sometimes use the pointwise extension of
relations and operators. Given a relation ≼ ⊆ Y × Y , an operator
⋎ ∈ Y × Y −→ Y and a set X , the pointwise extension Û≼ ⊆ (X −→
Y )×(X −→ Y ), of≼, is defined as f Û≼ f ′ ≜ (∀x ∈ X . f (x) ≼ f ′(x))
and the pointwise extension Û⋎ ∈ (X −→ Y ) × (X −→ Y ) −→ (X −→ Y ),
of ⋎, is defined as f Û⋎ f ′ ≜ λx ∈ X . f (x)⋎ f ′(x).
The domain is an abstraction of ℘(℘(Z)). In [17], the authors
claim that a hyperdomain, i.e., a domain suitable for the verification
of hyperproperties, can be decomposed in an inner abstraction,
approximating traces, and in an outer abstraction, approximating
properties of traces. Following this idea, we use as inner abstraction
the one for the classic constant propagation domain: it represents
precisely the singletons {n}, for every n ∈ Z, and it abstracts to Z
everything else. Instead, the outer abstraction checks whether the
inner abstraction always returns constant values, not necessarily
the same. For instance, {{1}, {2}} contains only constant sets, in-
stead {{1}, {2, 3}} contains also a not-constant set (in this case the
inner abstraction maps {2, 3} to Z).
We follow [17] defining Chc ≜ ℘({{n} | n ∈ Z}) ∪ {℘(Z)},
αhc ≜ λX . ( X ⊆ {{n} | n ∈ Z} ? X : ℘(Z) ) and γhc ≜ id. Then we
have the Galois insertion:
⟨℘(℘(Z)), ⊆⟩ −−−−→←−−−−−αhc
γhc ⟨Chc, ⊆⟩
This domain, as proved in [17], is sufficient for Non-Interference
verification, but, as observed at the beginning of this section, it is
2This is a sufficient condition in order to form a Galois connection.
not machine-representable. For this reason we need to perform a
further approximation.
The domain Chc has an uncountable set of elements, so we define
a simpler domain, which is machine-representable but still able to
verify Non-Interference. Let Z¯ be a set isomorphic to Z, aiming at
representing sets containing only one singleton, i.e., of the form
{{n}}, which is the information we want to observe precisely, and
let ¯ ∈ Z −→ Z¯ a bijection. Furthermore, we denote by κ the abstract
element representing the set of all singletons. Then we define Ch ≜
{n¯ | n ∈ Z}∪ {⊥,⊤,κ}, with the partial order⊴ ⊆ Ch ×Ch defined
as c1 ⊴ c2 ≜ (c1 = ⊥ ∨ c1 = c2 ∨ (c1 = n¯ ∧ c2 = κ) ∨ c2 = ⊤). Now
consider the abstraction αℏ ∈ Chc −→ Ch :
αℏ(X) ≜

⊥ if X = ∅
n¯ if X = {{n}}
κ if X ⊆ {{n} | n ∈ Z} ∧ |X| > 1
⊤ otherwise
Its corresponding concretization γℏ ∈ Ch −→ Chc is such that
γℏ(⊥) = ∅, γℏ(n¯) = {{n}}, γℏ(κ) = {{n} | n ∈ Z} and γℏ(⊤) =
℘(Z). Then we have the following Galois insertion:
⟨Chc, ⊆⟩ −−−−→←−−−−−αℏ
γℏ ⟨Ch ,⊴⟩
The domain ⟨Ch ,⊴,▽,△,⊥,⊤⟩ is a compete lattice where ▽,△ ∈
Ch × Ch −→ Ch are:
c1 ▽ c2 ≜

⊤ if c1 = ⊤ ∨ c2 = ⊤
⊥ if c1 = ⊥ ∧ c2 = ⊥
n¯ if
(c1 = ⊥ ∧ c2 = n¯) ∨ (c1 = n¯ ∧ c2 = ⊥)
∨ (c1 = n¯ ∧ c2 = n¯)
κ otherwise
c1 △ c2 ≜

⊤ if c1 = ⊤ ∧ c2 = ⊤
⊥ if c1 = ⊥ ∨ c2 = ⊥ ∨ (c1 = n¯ , m¯ = c2)
n¯ if (c1 = n¯ ∧ c2 ∈ {κ, ⊤}) ∨ (c2 = n¯ ∧ c1 ∈ {κ, ⊤})
κ otherwise
By composition, αh ≜ αℏ ◦αhc and γh ≜ γhc ◦γℏ form the insertion:
⟨℘(℘(Z)), ⊆⟩ −−−−→−←−−−−−αh
γh ⟨Ch ,⊴⟩
This domain approximates the set of sets of values a variable may
have. Finally, in order to track information flows we need to work
on memories instead of on values.
Consider a “double” non-relational abstraction for sets of sets of
memories. Let ÛMem ≜ Var −→ ℘(℘(Z)) and αnnr ∈ ℘(℘(Mem)) −→ÛMem be αnnr (X) ≜ λx . {{m(x) | m ∈ X } | X ∈ X}. We have the
following Galois connection, with γnnr ≜ α−nnr :
⟨℘(℘(Mem)), ⊆⟩ −−−−−−→←−−−−−−αnnr
γnnr ⟨ ÛMem, Û⊆⟩
Now we can compose point-wise (the machine-representable
version of) the hyperlevel constants abstraction with αnnr , obtain-
ing αm ≜ λX . λx . αh (αnnr (X)(x)). This latter forms, paired with
γm ≜ α−m , the Galois connection:
⟨℘(℘(Mem)), ⊆⟩ −−−−→←−−−−αm
γm ⟨Var −→ Ch , Û⊴⟩
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We denote withMem♮ the set Var −→ Ch and we call its elements
m abstract memories. In order to simplify the notation, we let ⊑≜
Û⊴, ⊔ ≜ Û▽, ⊓ ≜ Û△, ⊥♮ ≜ λx .⊥ and ⊤♮ ≜ λx .⊤. We have that
⟨Mem♮ ,⊑,⊔,⊓,⊥♮,⊤♮⟩ is a complete lattice. This latter is indeed
our abstract hyperdomain of computation.
Example 4.2. Let us show in a simple example how this abstrac-
tion works. Continuing Ex. 3.3, we have: I2,L= {{a, b}, {c, d}} and
αm({{a, b}, {c, d}})= [x 7→αh ({{0}, {1}}) y 7→αh ({{0, 1}})] = [x 7→
κ y 7→⊤]. Indeed a, b both provide 0 to x and c, d both provide 1
to x, while a, b provide both 0 and 1 to y and c, d provide both 0
and 1 to y. Similarly, JPKhI2,L = {{b, d}} and αm({{b, d}}) = [x 7→
αh ({{0, 1}}) y 7→αh ({{1}})] = [x 7→⊤ y 7→ 1¯].
It is worth noting that, given X ⊆ equivL, then every set in X
contains L-equivalent memories. This implies αm(X)(x) , ⊤, for
each L variable x. So, theNon-Interference check JPKhI2,L ⊆ equivL
becomes equivalent to checking whether αm(JPKhI2,L)(x) , ⊤, for
each L variable x. Indeed the program of Ex. 4.2 is interferent, since
computing αm(JPKhI2,L) results in L variable x having value ⊤.
Finally, we can show how the abstract domain Mem♮ can be
used for Non-Interference verification, with the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Let mNI ∈ Mem♮ be the abstract memory defined
asmNI(x) ≜ (Γ(x) = L?κ :⊤). Then P |= NI iff αm(JPKhI2,L) ⊑ mNI.
Proof. By definition of Galois connection: αm(JPKhI2,L) ⊑ mNI
iff JPKhI2,L ⊆ γm(mNI). It is clear that γm(mNI) ⊆ equivL, since
the concretization of mNI contains L-equivalent memories, by con-
struction. Hence, due to Prop. 4.1, the theorem is proved. □
Hence, in order to verify Non-Interference it is sufficient an
abstract semantics, computing onMem♮ , which approximates JPKh .
Indeed we can prove P |= NI by computing an over-approximation
of JPKhI2,L inMem♮ .
4.2.2 The Abstract Semantics for Non-Interference. Finally, we have
to show how to compute a program’s collecting hypersemantics
on the proposed abstract domain. The abstract semantics for pro-
grams relies on the abstract semantics for boolean and arithmetic
expressions, given in Fig. 3,4. The abstract semantics for arithmetic
expressions LaM♮ ∈ Mem♮ −→ Ch evaluates to an abstract value
and it relies on the abstract (mathematical) operations given in
Fig. 3. This semantics is such that abstract assignments are sound
approximations of the concrete ones. We obtain this defining ab-
stract operations ⊕♮ such that they are sound w.r.t. the concrete
ones ⊕, with ⊕ ∈ {+,−, ∗}. This technically means that they satisfy
the following constraint3:
{{X ∋ n ⊕m ∈ Y } | X ∈ γh (c1),Y ∈ γh (c2)} ⊆ γh (c1 ⊕♮ c2)
The constraint basically requires that every possible result obtained
applying the concrete operation is contained in the concretization
of the application of the abstract operator.
The abstract semantics for booleans LbM♮ ∈ Mem♮ −→ Mem♮
is an abstract filtering function. To simplify, we assume that all
negations ¬ have been removed using DeMorgan’s laws and usual
arithmetic laws: ¬(b1∨b2) ≡ (¬b1)∧(¬b2), ¬(a1 < a2) ≡ (a2 ≤ a1),
3Recall that our abstract semantics is built after the “double” non-relational abstraction
αnnr , hence it abstracts ÛMem = Var −→ ℘(℘(Z)).
Arithmetic expressions: La M♮ ∈ Mem♮ −→ Ch with ⊕ ∈ {+, −, ∗}Ln M♮m ≜ n¯ Lx M♮m ≜ m(x) L (a) M♮m ≜ La M♮mLa1 ⊕ a2 M♮m ≜ La1 M♮m ⊕♮ La2 M♮m
Abstract operations: ⊕♮ ∈ Ch × Ch −→ Ch
⊕♮ ⊥ n¯ κ ⊤
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
m¯ ⊥ m ⊕ n κ ⊤
κ ⊥ κ κ ⊤
⊤ ⊥ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
Figure 3: Abstract semantics for arithmetic expressions.
Boolean expressions: Lb M♮ ∈ Mem♮ −→ Mem♮ Z∈ {=, ,, <, ≤}Ltt M♮m ≜ m Lff M♮m ≜ ⊥♮ L (b) M♮m ≜ Lb M♮m
Lb1 ∨ b2 M♮m ≜ let n = Lb1 M♮m ⊔ Lb2 M♮m inλx . (m(x) = ⊤ ∧ x ∈ vars(b1) ∩ vars(b2) ? ⊤ : n(x) )Lb1 ∧ b2 M♮m ≜ Lb1 M♮m ⊓ Lb2 M♮m
La1 Z a2 M♮m ≜ let ⟨c1, c2 ⟩ = La1 M♮m Z♮ La2 M♮m in⊔{n ⊑m | La1 M♮n ⊴ c1 } ⊓ ⊔{n ⊑m | La2 M♮n ⊴ c2 }
Abstract comparators Z♮ ∈ Ch × Ch −→ Ch × Ch :
c1 Z♮ c2 ≜

⟨⊥, ⊥⟩ if c1 = ⊥ or c2 = ⊥
⟨n¯, n¯ ⟩ if c1 = c2 = n¯, Z∈ {=, ≤}
⟨n¯, m¯ ⟩ if c1 = n¯, c2 = m¯, n < m, Z∈ {<, ≤, ,}
⟨n¯, m¯ ⟩ if c1 = n¯, c2 = m¯, n > m, Z∈ {,}
⟨⊤, ⊤⟩ otherwise
Figure 4: Abstract semantics for boolean expressions.
etc. This semantics must be sound w.r.t. the collecting hyperseman-
tics for booleans, namely JbKhγm(m) ⊆ γm(LbM♮). In order to obtain
this, we have defined the abstract comparators Z♮ such that they
are sound w.r.t. the concrete ones Z, with Z∈ {=,,, <, ≤}. This
technically means that they satisfy the following constraint:
let X = {{⟨n ∈ X ,m ∈ Y ⟩ | n Z m} | X ∈ γh (c1),Y ∈ γh (c2)} in
{{n | ⟨n,m⟩ ∈ X } | X ∈ X} ⊆ γh ((c1 Z♮ c2)⊢)
{{m | ⟨n,m⟩ ∈ X } | X ∈ X} ⊆ γh ((c1 Z♮ c2)⊣)
The constraint basically requires that every possible pair of values
making true the concrete comparator is contained in the concretiza-
tion of the application of the abstract comparator. In Fig. 4, the term⊔{n ⊑ m | LaM♮n ⊴ c} can be computed with a backward abstract
semantics for expressions (as we actually do in the implementation)
but we omit here its definition for space reasons. The function
vars(b) returns the set of variables occurring in b.
Example 4.4. Let us see how to compute Lx < 2M♮m where m =
[x 7→ 1¯ y 7→κ]. We have LxM♮m = 1¯, L2M♮m = 2¯ and 1¯ <♮ 2¯ = ⟨1¯, 2¯⟩.
Then
⊔{n ⊑ m | LxM♮n ⊴ 1¯} = [x 7→ 1¯ y 7→ κ] and ⊔{n ⊑
m | L2M♮n ⊴ 2¯} = [x 7→ 1¯ y 7→κ]. The intersection is, indeed, equal
to m. Suppose now to compute the negation of x < 2, namely we
want to compute L2 ≤ xM♮m. In this case we have 2¯ ≤♮ 1¯ = ⟨⊤,⊤⟩
and
⊔{n ⊑ m | L2M♮n ⊴ ⊤} = ⊔{n ⊑ m | LxM♮n ⊴ ⊤} = [x 7→
1¯ y 7→κ]. Hence we obtain [x 7→ 1¯ y 7→κ] as result.
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Finally, we need two auxiliary functions vars⊤m(b) and vars:=(P),
returning the set of variables occurring in b having value ⊤ when
evaluated in m and the set of modified variables in P, respectively.
The first is easy to compute: vars⊤m(b) ≜ {x ∈ vars(b) | m(x) = ⊤}
and vars(b) is just a syntactic check. The second involves semantic
information, hence it is not trivial to compute. At the moment, we
adopt a simple syntactic approach for approximating the set of
variables which may be modified during P executions. Indeed, the
function vars:=(P) returns the set of variables occurring in P on
the left-hand side of an assignment, which is easy implementable
as a syntactic check. We plan to enhance our abstract semantics
with a semantic check for modified variables, in order to increase
precision, as a future work.
Now we have all the ingredients needed to define the abstract
collecting hypersemantics JPKh
♮
∈ Mem♮ −→ Mem♮ , which is:
JPKh♮ ⊥♮ ≜ ⊥♮ JP1 ; P2Kh♮ m ≜ JP2Kh♮ JP1Kh♮ m
JskipKh♮ m ≜ m Jx B aKh♮ m ≜ m[x ← [ LaM♮m]
Jif b {P1} else {P2}Kh♮ m ≜ w where
let n = JP1Kh♮ LbM♮m ⊔ JP2Kh♮ L¬bM♮m in
w = λx .

n(x) if x < vars
:=(P1) ∪ vars:=(P2) ∨
(n(x) ⊴ κ ∧ n(x) , κ) ∨ vars⊤m(b) = ∅
⊤ otherwise
Jwhile b {P}Kh♮ m ≜ L¬bM♮(lfp⊑⊥♮ λn.m⊔Jif b {P} else {skip}Kh♮ n)
The abstract semantics is quite standard for all statements, except
for conditionals. Wewill explain here only this latter, which exploits
the following idea. For every variable, we make the join between
its value resulting after the execution of the true branch and its
value resulting after the execution of the false branch. This is done
in order to track the forbidden flows (implicit or explicit) generated
inside the two branches. In fact, a L variable has value ⊤ after
the join if in at least one of the branches it has value ⊤ (meaning
that there is a forbidden flow). After this check we need to take
in consideration the implicit flows generated by the conditional
statement itself. Indeed, first we suppose that if there is at least one
variable with value ⊤ before the boolean guard is evaluated, then
all variables modified in the conditional branches have a forbidden
flow (a variable has value ⊤ only if it is a H variable or if it has been
“influence” by a H variable). This is done setting to ⊤ all modified
variables. Note that if, for some reasons, aH variable is not⊤ during
this check, the flow is correctly not set. This procedure is sound
but not so precise. In order to enhance precision, we exploit our
abstract domain. In particular, we do not set to ⊤ the variables
which have the same constant value n¯ in both branches (this is the
condition (n(x) ⊴ κ ∧ n(x) , κ)) because this means that at the
end of the conditional statement the variable has always a constant
value. If there are no ⊤-valued variables into b (this is the condition
vars⊤m(b) = ∅), then no variables are set to ⊤: the resulting flows
are those generated into the two branches of the conditional.
We proved that our abstract semantics is sound w.r.t. the collect-
ing hypersemantics, and that it can be used for Non-Interference
verification. This is stated in the following two theorems.
Theorem 4.5 (Soundness). The abstract collecting hyperseman-
tics is a sound approximation of the collecting hypersemantics:
∀X ∈ ℘(℘(Mem)) . αm(JPKhX) ⊑ JPKh♮ αm(X)
Proof. (Sketch) We just have to prove that the abstract collect-
ing hypersemantics approximates the best correct approximation of
the collecting hypersemantics inMem♮ , namely αmJPKhγm Û⊑ JPKh♮ .
The proof relies on the soundness of the abstract semantics for
arithmetic and boolean expressions and it is for structural induc-
tion. We omit here the full proof, we just show as example the case
for programs sequences:
αmJP1 ; P2Khγm(m)
= ∥ definition of J·Kh
αmJP2KhJP1Khγm(m)
⊑ ∥ extensivity of γmαm
αmJP2KhγmαmJP1Khγm(m)
⊑ ∥ inductive hypothesis: αmJPi Khγm Û⊑JPi Kh♮ with i ∈{1,2}JP2Kh♮ JP1Kh♮ (m)
= ∥ definition of J·Kh
♮JP1 ; P2Kh♮ (m)
□
. With the abstract semantics just introduced we can define an
effective verification method for Non-Interference.
Theorem 4.6 (Non-Interference Verification). We have that
a program satisfies Non-interference P |= NI if JPKh
♮
mNI ⊑ mNI.
Proof. Note that αm(I2,L) ⊑ mNI since I2,L contains only sets of
memories agreeing on L variables. This means that αm(I2,L)(x) ⊴
κ = mNI(x), for each L variable x. For H variables y, αm(I2,L)(y) ⊴
⊤ = mNI(y) trivially holds. Then the proof is given by the following
implications:JPKh♮ mNI ⊑ mNI
⇓ ∥ monotonicity of JPKh
♮
and αm(I2,L)⊑mNIJPKh♮ αm(I2,L) ⊑ JPKh♮ mNI ⊑ mNI
⇓ ∥ soundness of JPKh
♮
(Thm. 4.5)
αm(JPKhI2,L) ⊑ JPKh♮ αm(I2,L) ⊑ JPKh♮ mNI ⊑ mNI
⇓ ∥ Thm. 4.3
P |= NI
□
This means that we can check Non-Interference simply by check-
ing that each set of computations, starting from L-equivalent mem-
ories, provides only singletons as results.
5 THE PROTOTYPE ANALYZER
With the only aim of proving the feasibility of the proposed ap-
proach, and in particular of the abstract hypersemantics, we have
written a prototype analyzer in Java SE 10 for Imp programs, which
implements the abstract collecting semantics of Sec. 4. The tool,
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Program P1:
a B 0 ;
if (b < x) { b B a ∗ 3 }
else {b B a − ((2 ∗ a) − a)}
Program P2:
a B x ;
if (b < a) { b B 2 }
else {b B 3}
Program P3:
a B x − x
Program P4:
a B 0 ;
while (x < y) {
x B x + 1 ;
while (a < x) {a B a + 2} ;
a B 0
}
Figure 5: Example programs.
called nonInterfer, can be tested on-line, through a web interface,
at the link http://bit.do/noninterfer.
5.1 Validation
Since our analyzer is built for a toy language, there are no bench-
mark test sets. So we have measured speed and precision of the
tool building our own test set. We have written 25 non-interferent
programs and 25 interferent programs, with different levels of com-
plexity. As expected, the prototype does not output false negatives,
i.e., all interferent programs are discovered. For what concerns pre-
cision, the analyzer marks 3 programs as interferent even if they ac-
tually satisfy Non-Interference. In Fig. 5 we have four example pro-
grams, where variables a, b are public and variables x, y are private.
The initial abstract memorymNI is [a 7→κ b 7→κ x 7→⊤ y 7→⊤]. We
have that JP1Kh♮ mNI = [a 7→ 0¯ b 7→ 0¯ x 7→⊤ y 7→⊤] ⊑ mNI, meaning
that the analyzer correctly marks P1 as non-interferent. Analyzing
program P2, the verifier is able to catch an implicit indirect flow, in
fact JP2Kh♮ mNI = [a 7→⊤ b 7→⊤ x 7→⊤ y 7→⊤] @ mNI (i.e., P2 is
correctly marked as interferent). Unfortunately, our analyzer sig-
nals a false alarm in program P3, indeed JP3Kh♮ mNI = [a 7→⊤ b 7→
κ x 7→ ⊤ y 7→ ⊤] @ mNI, even if the program is non-interferent.
Finally, we have a precise result on the more complex program P4,
indeed JP4Kh♮ mNI = [a 7→ 0¯ b 7→κ x 7→⊤ y 7→⊤] ⊑ mNI.
The finite height of the hyper abstract domain Ch guarantees the
termination of the analysis. Furthermore, the structure of the do-
main allows us to compute loops fixpoints quickly, hence there is no
need for a widening operator in order to speed-up the analysis. On
our test set, which comprises quite small hand-made programs, the
analyzer is very fast. The analysis time is around 120 milliseconds
in average, running on a commodity hardware4. We also tested the
prototype on bigger programs, generated automatically with the
tool Grammarinator[15]. The analyzer is able to handle programs
with hundreds of lines of code, basically with the same speed time.
As expected, the analyzer shows some slowdowns when programs
use lots of variables. Nevertheless, its running time is lower than
600 milliseconds even on programs with more than 500 variables.
Indeed the analyzer exhibits a good trade-off between verifica-
tion speed and precision (in general). Unfortunately, our analyzer
is not precise in some trivial situations, like in P3, hence in the next
subsection we show how it is possible to get better results.
4Laptop with Arch Linux 64-bit (kernel 4.17.5-1), Intel Core i7-7700HQ CPU, 8GiB
RAM and SSD storage.
5.2 Improving Precision
The analyzer has a good precision overall but it signals false alarms
in some, sometimes very trivial, cases. We mentioned in the pre-
vious section that our current approach for the approximation of
modified variables is a very simple syntactic check. With a more se-
mantic analysis we can gain precision and do not arise false alarms
for programs like P3 of Fig. 5. Apart from this detail, the sources
of imprecision of our semantics are basically two: the approxi-
mation added making the hyperlevel constants domain machine-
representable and the lack of relational information between vari-
ables. In this section we deal with these two issues.
5.2.1 Tuning the Hyperlevel Constants Domain. The original hy-
perlevel constants domain of [17] contains all the elements of the
powerset of {{n} | n ∈ Z}, meaning that every possible combina-
tion of constant sets is taken into account. This makes the domain
very precise but not machine-representable, as already observed. In
our implementation we have chosen to represent precisely only the
singletons {{n}}, abstracted to n¯, and the set of all singleton sets
{{n} | n ∈ Z}, abstracted to κ. In order to enhance precision we
could extend our domain Ch with pairs of constant sets, namely we
can represent sets of the form {{n}, {m}}, with n,m ∈ Z. But we
can gain more precision taking into account triples, quadruples and
so on. Hence we can infinitely tune the precision of the analyzer.
Clearly the more elements we add to the domain and the more space
is consumed by the analyzer and the more abstract operations are
complex. So, the trade-off between precision and performance of
analysis depends on the analyzer’s context of application.
5.2.2 Add Relational Information. Our analysis is not-relational,
meaning that we do not explicitly track relations between different
variables. We can increase the precision pairing Mem♮ with a re-
lational abstraction of ℘(℘(Mem)). For instance we can define an
abstract domain tracking equalities between variables. This latter,
combined with a numerical domain such as the one for intervals
will improve the precision w.r.t. implicit flows.
b B 1 ;
if (b = x) {
a B 3 ;
while (a! = 1) {
a B a − 1 ;
b B a
}
} else {a B 1}
[a 7→L b 7→L x 7→H]
Take, as example, the program here
on the left. Our analyzer signals a
false alarm, since the program is non-
interferent but our analysis outputs
an abstract memory assigning ⊤ to all
variables. With an interval analysis we
are able to find that variable a is equal
to [1, 1] at the end of thewhile andwith
a domain tracking equalities we can de-
duce the same for variable b. Hence, at
the end of the program we can better our analysis obtaining the
abstract memory [a 7→ 1¯ b 7→ 1¯ x 7→⊤], allowing us to prove that
the program is non-interferent.
6 RELATEDWORK
The closest related works are [3] and [20], which both deal with hy-
perproperties by means of abstract interpretation. In the second, the
authors define a hyperproperty called Input Data Usage, claiming
that it generalizes a lot of notion of information flows, comprising
Non-Interference. They propose an ad-hoc hypersemantics useful
to verify that hyperproperty. Then they show how it is possible
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to obtain, by abstraction of their semantics, some known verifica-
tion methods for information flows. The work of [3] is focused on
Non-Interference, indeed they propose two abstract semantics: one
for (qualitative) Non-Interference and one for quantitative Non-
Interference. Quantitative information flows go beyond the scope
of the present work, hence we do not take in consideration that
case. For the other case, we have that our abstract domain is not
directly comparable with the “dependences” abstract domain of [3].
Nevertheless our abstract semantics is able to state correctly the
non-interference of the program in Listing 5 of [3] without any tun-
ing for precision. The dependences abstract semantics of [3] needs
to add the Intervals domain in order to reach this level of precision.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, none of the previous works
have an implementation, even for a toy language, supporting their
theoretical results.
Another relatedwork is [2], where authors propose a newmethod-
ology for proving the absence of timing channels. This work is based
on the idea of “decomposition instead of self-composition”. The idea
is to partition the program semantics and to analyze each partition
with standard methods. Their approach is similar to our method for
simplifying the verification of Non-Interference. Nevertheless, for
each partition they verify a classic trace property, instead we verify
a hyperproperty. This lead us to better results w.r.t. precision.
Non-Interference is a k-hypersafety (with k = 2) hence it can
be verified with a classic mechanism for safety trace properties
on the k times self-composed system. The self-composition can be
sequential, parallel or in an interleaving manner and a lot of works
applied this methodology [5, 18, 19]. Unfortunately, this approach
seems to be computationally to expensive to be used in practice
[2]. Besides the reduction to safety, in [1] the authors introduce
a runtime refutation method for k-hypersafety, based on a three-
valued logic. Similarly, [6, 13] define hyperlogics (HyperLTL and
HyperCTL/CTL∗ ), i.e., extensions of temporal logic able to quantify
over multiple traces. Some algorithms for model-checking in these
extended temporal logics exist, but only for particular decidable
fragments, since the model-checking problem for these logics is, in
general, undecidable.
Classic methods for Non-Interference verification, which do not
take in consideration its hyperproperty nature, comprise the type
systems à la Volpano [21]. These latter perform just syntactic checks,
with our approach we have more precision since we can exploit
semantic information. The new logic-based approaches showed up
recently seem very promising, like the epistemic temporal logic
of [4] and SecLTL [12]. They extend classic temporal logics with
modalities useful for the verification of Non-Interference. It is not so
easy to compare our work with these latter, we let as a future work
to deepen the link between these logics and our abstract semantics.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this work, we show step by step how to build a static analyzer
for Non-Interference, based on abstract interpretation. The tool
is sound, meaning that it will not signals false negative, i.e., if
the analyzer returns that a program is non-interferent then it is
guaranteed that it satisfies Non-Interference. We have soundness
by design, exploiting the framework of abstract interpretation. We
follow the theoretical work of [17] and we made their abstract
domain computer-representable, hence we show how to make their
analysis feasible. Furthermore, we simplified the process of Non-
Interference verification, moving from a semantics computing on
input/output traces to a simpler semantics computing on memories.
We implemented our analyzer, called nonInterfer in order to
validate our abstract semantics. The testing on our prototype has
lead to very promising results, in particular w.r.t. analysis speed.
Non-Interference verification is undecidable, hence we have ob-
viously false negative, namely sometimes our analyzer marks as
interferent a program which actually satisfies Non-interference.
Despite its simplicity and speed, our analyzer is quite precise, at
least as precise as classic type systems for Non-Interference.
As a future work, we will increase the precision of nonInterfer,
adding the possibility to track relational information between dif-
ferent variables. Finally, since the results on Imp are promising, we
planned the porting of nonInterfer to a real-world programming
language, in order to see its performance on more challenging tests.
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